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The New Revolving Door 
Michael P. Vandenbergh,† Jonathan M. Gilligan,†† and Haley 
Feuerman††† 
Abstract 
This Article demonstrates that a new revolving door is emerging 
between environmental-advocacy groups and the private sector. Since 
the birth of the modern regulatory state, scholars have raised concerns 
that the revolving door between corporations and government agencies 
could induce government officials to pursue corporate interests rather 
than the public interest. The legal and political-science literatures have 
identified several benefits that may arise from the revolving door, but 
the thrust of the scholarship to date has emphasized the potential 
harms. Using several data sources, we demonstrate that as the private 
sector has begun to play an increasing role in environmental governance 
in recent years, a new revolving door has emerged between 
environmental-advocacy groups and corporations, institutional 
investment firms, and private equity firms. We demonstrate that this 
new revolving door is surprisingly common, and we examine the 
implications for the future of public and private environmental 
governance. Although this new revolving door creates new risks, we 
argue that it may turn on its head the central concern about the 
revolving door: The movement of environmental advocates into 
corporate management positions may play the role of greening 
corporate behavior and may accelerate the development of private 
environmental initiatives. We focus on the movement of employees in 
the environmental area—a new green revolving door—but we suggest 
that this new revolving door also may be emerging in labor, health and 
safety, and other regulatory areas. 
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Introduction 
Private equity firms have been criticized for pursuing profits at the 
expense of social justice,1 yet the Carlyle Group and Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts (KKR), two of the world’s leading private equity firms, have 
recruited top environmental-advocacy-group staffers to serve as 
sustainability managers.2 Similar hiring has occurred elsewhere in the 
private sector, including not only private equity firms, but also 
institutional investors and Fortune 500 corporations. Why is this 
occurring? What effect is it having on environmental governance? 
This symposium examines the role of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) in environmental law and policy over the last fifty years 
and looks forward to the next fifty years. Our goal in this Article is to 
contribute to the forward-looking aspect of the symposium by 
demonstrating how private environmental governance will affect a core 
concern of environmental-law scholarship over the next fifty years. We 
present the results of an empirical study of the movement of employees 
from environmental-advocacy groups to corporations, institutional 
investors, and private equity firms, and we demonstrate that this new 
green revolving door is surprisingly common. We argue that the new 
revolving door poses some risks to environmental governance, but it is 
an indication of the growing importance of private environmental 
governance and a potential driver of additional pro-environmental 
activity by the private sector. 
 
1. See Editorial Bd., Opinion, The Peculiar Debate over Mr. Romney’s 
Business Record, Wash. Post (Jan. 10, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost 
 .com/opinions/the-peculiar-debate-over-mr-romneys-business-record/2012/ 
 01/10/gIQATw6MpP_story.html [https://perma.cc/X9DU-HTUH] 
(discussing Bain Capital). 
2. See infra Part II. 
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Private environmental governance occurs when private 
organizations, including corporations, civic and cultural organizations, 
religious organizations, colleges and universities, and other non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) perform environmental-protection 
functions traditionally assigned to governments, such as reducing 
negative externalities, managing common-pool resources, and affecting 
the distribution of environmental amenities.3 In the last decade, the 
social-science and legal literatures have demonstrated that private 
initiatives now play an important governance role in most of the 
subject-matter areas addressed by the EPA and other federal 
environmental and natural-resource agencies, including climate 
mitigation, product- and project-based environmental disclosure, toxics 
regulation, and the management of fisheries and forests.4 Private 
governance initiatives also deploy many of the same instruments or 
tools as public governance.5 
The growth of private environmental governance raises a range of 
questions about the extent to which private initiatives can perform 
environmental-protection functions even in the absence of government 
leadership.6 But the emergence of private environmental governance  
3. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 
Cornell L. Rev. 129, 133 (2013). 
4. Sarah E. Light & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental 
Governance, in Decision Making in Envtl. Law 253–54 (LeRoy C. 
Paddock et al. eds., 2016); Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation 
as Environmental Law, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 137, 139–41 (2019); Jonathan 
M. Gilligan, Carrots and Sticks in Private Climate Governance, 6 Tex. 
A&M L. Rev. 179, 179–80 (2018); Will Martin, Marine Stewardship 
Council: A Case Study in Private Environmental Standard-Setting, 44 
Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10,097, 10,097 (2014) (fisheries); 
Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Can Non-State Global Governance 
Be Legitimate? An Analytical Framework, 1 Reg. & Governance 347, 
347–50 (2007) (forests); Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories: 
States, Social Movements, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the 
Apparel and Forest Products Fields, 31 Pol. & Soc’y 433, 433–34 (2003) 
(forests and apparel); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The 
Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow 
of the State, in The Politics of Global Regulation 44–46 (Walter 
Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (international environmental issues); 
Zdravka Tzankova, Interactions Between Private and Public Resource 
Governance; Key Insights from the Fisheries Case, 6 Wm. & Mary 
Pol'y Rev. 1 (2014); Zdravka Tzankova, Can Private Governance Boost 
Public Policy? Insights from Public-Private Governance Interactions in 
the Fisheries and Electricity Sectors, Reg. and Governance (2020). 
5. Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private 
Environmental Governance, 5 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 1, 4–5 
(2015). 
6. For an identification of emerging issues of interest to environmental 
lawyers, see Michael P. Vandenbergh & Ben Raker, Private Governance 
and the New Private Advocacy, 32 Nat. Resources & Env’t 45, 45–49 
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also affects many of the cross-cutting aspects of governance that public-
law scholars have studied for decades, such as administration, 
accountability, cost-benefit analysis, equity, and spillover effects. In this 
Article, we examine the implications of private governance for concerns 
about agency capture arising from the revolving door. In the legal and 
political-science literatures, the revolving door refers to the movement 
of employees between government and corporations.7 Scholars have 
examined the mechanisms of this phenomenon and its effects on 
industries, agencies, and society, but the revolving-door literature has 
assumed that governance means public governance, and thus the focus 
has been on the movement of individuals between the corporations and 
government.8 
Political scientists and legal scholars thus use the term revolving 
door to describe the movement of legislators, regulators, and lobbyists 
between the private and public sectors.9 The door swings in both 
directions as individuals rotate from corporate jobs to government 
positions and vice versa. Although some scholars see merit in the 
revolving door’s ability to foster interconnectedness between the public 
and private sectors,10 many have raised concerns that the revolving door 
 
(2017); Zdravka Tzankova, Public Policy Spillovers from Private Energy 
Governance: New Opportunities for the Political Acceleration of 
Renewable Energy Transitions, 67 Energy Res. & Soc. Sci. (2020). 
7. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture 
Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 46 (2010) [hereinafter 
Barkow, Insulating Agencies] (discussing the capture risks arising from 
the government-private sector revolving door); Rachel E. Barkow, 
Explaining and Curbing Capture, 18 N.C. Banking Inst. 17, 19 (2013) 
[hereinafter Barkow, Curbing Capture]; Wenton Zheng, The Revolving 
Door, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1265, 1266–68 (2015) (same); Jeffrey E. 
Cohen, The Dynamics of the “Revolving Door” on the FCC, 30 Am. J. 
Pol. Sci. 689, 689–90 (1986) (same); William T. Gormley, Jr., A Test of 
the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC, 23 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 665, 681 
(1979) (concluding that “the appointment of a former employee of a 
regulated industry to a regulatory agency does increase the likelihood of 
decisions favorable to the regulated industry”). 
8. See, e.g., Edna Earle Vass Johnson, Agency “Capture”: The “Revolving 
Door” Between Regulated Industries and Their Regulating Agencies, 18 
U. Rich. L. Rev. 95, 95–96 (1983) (assessing capture risks and benefits 
and focusing exclusively on government–private sector employee 
movement); Zheng, supra note 7, at 1266–68 (same); Barkow, Insulating 
Agencies, supra note 7, at 46 (same). 
9. See, e.g., Zheng, supra note 7, at 1266. Although the revolving door exists 
in many disciplines, the concept is most frequently discussed by political 
scientists and legal scholars in connection with agency capture and related 
issues. See id. at 1270–72. 
10. David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 507, 511–12 (2013). 
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may lead to undue corporate influence over government decisions.11 In 
particular, the fear is that the exchange of personnel may undermine 
government integrity or lead to regulatory capture.12 A captured agency 
is disproportionately influenced by the entities that it regulates, 
creating policies that serve the interests of corporations rather than the 
general public. It is difficult to measure whether an agency is captured, 
but capture in major regulatory agencies has been a longstanding 
concern in the public domain.13 Environmental agencies may be at a 
heightened risk of regulatory capture for several reasons. For instance, 
the costs of environmental regulations are high, creating strong 
incentives to reduce regulatory mandates. In addition, the complexity 
of environmental policy, such as regulations on water pollutants or 
greenhouse gases, makes it difficult for the general public to perceive 
manipulation within environmental agencies, making them more 
susceptible to regulatory capture than other agencies.14 
In Part I, the Article discusses the legal and political-science 
literatures on the standard public-governance conception of the 
revolving door between the public and private sectors, and it examines 
 
11. See, e.g., Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative 
Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1684–87 (1975) (discussing agency capture); 
Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 
341, 346 (2009) (“The revolving door between staffers and lobbyists, the 
lure of powerful contracts, the seductions of a wealthy community, and 
other forces all give regular work to what Hamilton called ‘the business of 
corruption’”) (quoting The Federalist No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
12. An agency may be considered captured when a majority of the individuals 
creating regulation were formerly employed by the regulated corporate. 
See Johnson, supra note 8, at 95. 
13. Barkow, Curbing Capture, supra note 7, at 17; Zheng, supra note 7, at 
1267. 
14. See Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1495, 1548–49 (1999) (“[T]he average citizen knows if he 
or she is getting adequate roads or schools and even has a sense of whether 
the government regulation of banks seems appropriate. In many 
environmental circumstances, however, no comparable basis for judging 
the adequacy of outcomes exists.”). Research by Joel Mintz has attempted 
to assess instances of possible capture within the EPA by evaluating the 
Agency’s enforcement policies from its creation in 1970 through 2004. Joel 
A. Mintz, Has Industry Captured the EPA?: Appraising Marver 
Bernstein’s Captive Agency Theory After Fifty Years, 17 Fordham 
Envt’l L. Rev. 1, 26, 36 (2005) (concluding that the “EPA’s enforcement 
work has been nearly captured by industry several times and that it was 
partially captured on one occasion”); see also Ping Lei et al., 
Determinants and Welfare of the Environmental Regulatory Stringency 
Before and After Regulatory Capture, 166 J. Cleaner Production 107, 
110, 113 (2017); Philip Mattera, USDA Inc.: How Agribusiness has 
Hijacked Regulatory Policy at the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture 32 (2004). 
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the federal statutory and regulatory responses. Part II then introduces 
the concept of the new revolving door between environmental-advocacy 
groups, on the one hand, and corporations, institutional investment 
firms, and private equity firms on the other. It then presents the results 
of the first empirical study of the new revolving door. We found that, 
of the entities we studied, roughly 6% of large companies, 15% of large 
institutional investment firms, and 29% of large private equity firms 
had at least one environmental manager who worked in the past at an 
environmental-advocacy group. Although far more research remains to 
be done, the results demonstrate that the new revolving door has 
emerged in the environmental field, producing different implications for 
governance than the standard revolving door. Although the new 
revolving door is not without risk, we argue that it may turn the central 
concern about the revolving door on its head: The movement of 
environmental advocates into private-sector management positions may 
play the role of greening the private sector and accelerating the 
development of private environmental initiatives. 
The Article concludes by noting that, although the empirical case 
for the new revolving door relies only on our limited data on recent 
employment in several sectors, our results set the stage for more 
comprehensive empirical studies. In addition, the existence of the new 
revolving door suggests that other common features of the public-
governance regime may need to be re-examined in light of the 
emergence of private environmental governance. We focus on the new 
revolving door involving environmental-advocacy groups and the 
private sector—a new green revolving door—but we suggest that the 
new revolving door also may be emerging in labor, health and safety, 
fair trade, food safety, and other regulatory areas.15 
I. The Traditional Revolving Door 
The concept of the revolving door has been a hardy perennial in 
the legal and political-science literatures for decades. Not surprisingly, 
given the central role played by government in environmental 
protection, labor, health and safety, and other areas, the focus of the 
revolving-door literature has been on the movement between 
government and the private sector. Scholars have identified positive 
and negative effects from the revolving door, but, on balance, the 
literature has focused more on the negative effects that could arise from 
government being co-opted by the private sector. The congressional 
response to such concerns reflects this perspective, and legislation 
adopted since World War II includes a range of provisions that restrict 
the most troubling revolving-door activity. Part II.A discusses the 
 
15. See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Kosher: Private Regulation in the 
Age of Industrial Food 129–30 (2013) (discussing the use of private 
certification agencies in the kosher food industry). 
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revolving-door literature, and Part II.B examines the statutory 
restrictions on the revolving-door-related activities of current and 
former government officials. 
A. Revolving-Door Literature 
Research on the revolving door has examined the topic both broadly 
as it relates to human behavior and narrowly, working from an 
assumption that employees are rational actors seeking to maximize 
utility in the form of future employment. Although the revolving door 
literature has identified a number of benefits that may arise from the 
revolving door, the research has identified more risks than benefits. We 
begin with a brief review of the benefits identified in the literature and 
then turn to the risks. 
1. Benefits 
Theoretical and empirical studies have identified several benefits to 
public governance that may arise from the revolving door, including 
increased expertise, addition of outside-expert perspectives, and the 
growth of human capital.16 On the expertise issue, scholars have noted 
that government agencies require substantial expertise on complex 
issues. As a result, the revolving door can be beneficial if private sector 
employees bring their knowledge about the operations of regulated 
entities to government agencies.17 On the issue of adding outside-expert 
perspectives, Sheila Jasanoff has observed that, to function effectively 
in evaluating the work of a regulatory agency, one needs skills that are 
best (or only) acquired through previous engagement with the agency; 
so individual experts engaging with regulatory agencies can be essential 
to producing qualified external evaluators of an agency’s work.18 This 
engagement could include working with the agency from the outside or 
employment in the agency. To the extent the revolving door facilitates 
an agency’s ability to identify and work with outside evaluators on 
complex issues, the revolving door may thus enhance the decision-
 
16. For an overview of the literature, see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, 
Revolving Elites: The Unexplored Risk of Capturing the SEC, 107 Geo. 
L.J. 845, 853–59 (2019) (discussing agency revolving-door concerns); 
Joshua McCrain, Revolving Door Lobbyists and the Value of 
Congressional Staff Connections, 80 J. Pol. 1369, 1369, 1380–82 (2018) 
(discussing legislative revolving-door concerns). 
17. Zaring, supra note 10, at 511–12. 
18. Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers As 
Policymakers 95 (1994) (“From [the] EPA’s point of view . . . the best 
scientific advisers are clearly those with the deepest understanding of 
regulatory science . . . . Such familiarity can rarely be acquired except 
through long and close association with the agency, a state that would be 
almost impossible to achieve under a policy of frequent rotations.’’); 
Harvey Brooks, The Resolution of Technically Intensive Public Policy 
Disputes, 9 Sci., Tech. & Hum. Values 39, 41 (1984). 
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making of the agency’s managers. Jasanoff has also argued that experts 
may not only bring subject-matter expertise to government (when they 
move into government positions from the private sector), but they also 
may bring strong political or normative views.19 Although this creates 
a risk that the experts may pursue corporate rather than public 
interests, Jasanoff argues that adding some private-sector perspectives 
to an agency’s decision-making process may enable the agency to 
produce more effective regulations.20 
A third potential benefit of the revolving door may arise from the 
growth of human capital. In this context, human capital refers to the 
skills and connections that an individual may accrue while working for 
the government.21 Although government employees typically earn lower 
salaries than those working in the private sector, the human-capital 
hypothesis suggests that the potential for learning key skills and making 
important connections is considered valuable compensation.22 The 
hypothesis applies to two types of individuals: less-qualified employees 
who are just beginning their careers and highly-qualified employees with 
years of experience.23 Less-experienced employees have an opportunity 
to develop corporate-specific human capital by working diligently and 
abiding by the rules. When a government employee is seeking to 
transition to the private sector, human capital becomes an important 
part of the applicant’s qualifications. Similarly, an individual in the 
public sector who has already accrued substantial skills and connections 
may be motivated to adhere to the rules and take aggressive 
enforcement actions to demonstrate their competence to future 
employers.24 In this view, human capital in the form of valuable skills 
or a positive reputation incentivizes honest, hard work in the public 
sector. Scholars who focus on human capital have also suggested that 
 
19. Jasanoff, supra note 18, at 230–31, 234. 
20. Id. 
21. See Yeon-Koo Che, Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for 
Agency Collusion, 26 RAND J. Econ. 378, 379 (1995). The human-
capital hypothesis may be particularly important in complex areas such 
as environmental law and policy. See e.g., Esty, supra note 14, at 1548. 
Of course, this discussion assumes that the current level of enforcement is 
suboptimal and that more stringent enforcement is desirable. See 
Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by Prosecution 83 (1982) (arguing 
that “[t]he so-called revolving door . . . provides a constant renewal of 
talent for both sectors”); Johnson, supra note 8, at 98–99 (noting the 
value of training government lawyers who later move into private 
practice). 
22. Che, supra note 21, at 393. 
23. Id. 
24. Zheng, supra note 7, at 1268. 
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the revolving door promotes stringent, rather than lax, enforcement of 
government rules and regulations.25 
2. Risks 
The legal and political-science literatures also have identified 
several risks arising from the standard revolving door. The first is “rent-
seeking,” or regulatory capture.26 Government employees may act in 
pro-corporate ways to curry favor with potential private-sector 
employers.27 The rent-seeking, or quid pro quo, theory suggests that the 
revolving door does not make federal officials more diligent policy-
makers or more stringent enforcers—as suggested by the human-capital 
hypothesis—but instead creates an environment where regulators and 
lawmakers are incentivized to act with more lenience.28 An explicit or 
implicit quid pro quo relationship thus may exist where preferential 
treatment towards a private firm is exchanged for future employment. 
A commissioner at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for 
example, may attempt to ease a regulation’s enforcement against a 
certain private firm to curry favor with that company.29 As a result, the 
firm may be inclined to repay the favor with a job offer. The rent-
seeking hypothesis aligns with the fundamentals of capture theory, 
suggesting that the revolving door compromises the integrity of 
government officials and has adverse effects on agencies’ effectiveness. 
Researchers who assume that government employees are seeking to 
maximize a narrow notion of utility often ground their concerns in 
public-choice theory.30 Much of the research has focused on two 
revolving-door models: entrance and exit.31 The entrance model refers 
to those who work at a private company or lobbying group prior to 
working for the government. As the model suggests, those who have 
 
25. See supra note 21. 
26. Stephen J. Choi et al., Should I Stay or Should I Go? The Gender Gap 
for Securities and Exchange Commission Attorneys, 62 J.L. & Econ. 
427, 431 (2019); see also Michael Smallberg, Project on Gov’t 
Oversight, Dangerous Liaisons: Revolving Door at SEC 
Creates Risk of Regulatory Capture 3 (2013). 
27. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 862–63; Ed deHaan et al., The 
Revolving Door and the SEC’s Enforcement Outcomes: Initial Evidence 
from Civil Litigation, 60 J. Acct. & Econ. 65, 91–92 (2015); Michael A. 
Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency 
Inaction, 101 Geo. L.J. 1353 (2013) (noting the incentive for government 
employees to develop “friendly relationships” while in government to 
facilitate later private-sector employment). 
28. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 862–63. 
29. See deHaan et al., supra note 27, at 66. 
30. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 847. 
31. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 690; Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A 
Review, 22 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 203, 204 (2006). 
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experience in the private sector are more likely to make decisions that 
support corporations than those who do not have prior private-sector 
experience. In many cases, these entrance-model individuals may be 
ingrained with perspectives that are biased toward the private sector. 
For example, an SEC commissioner who was previously employed in 
the finance sector may vote to enforce programs that support that 
sector’s growth.32 The exit model of the revolving door describes 
individuals who work in the public sector before taking a position at a 
private firm. As with the entrance model, individuals who follow the 
exit model may make decisions while in government based on 
prospective job opportunities in the private sector.  
Both forms of the revolving door, entrance and exit, have become 
common in the federal legislative and executive branches. In a study of 
the revolving door among staff at the SEC, James Cox and Randall 
Thomas note that the risks of pro-corporate bias arising from the 
traditional revolving door among lower-level SEC employees may 
be limited by the fact that many of the SEC’s decisions are made 
with input from groups of employees and are subject to many layers 
of oversight.33 They conclude that a greater risk arises at the 
director level where those constraints are less influential.34 These 
results are consistent with the results of studies that examine 
potential revolving-door-based bias among commissioners at the 
SEC and Federal Communications Commission.35 
In addition to affecting the regulatory decision-making of agency 
managers, the revolving door also may undermine public confidence in 
government generally.36 Zahra Meghani and Jennifer Kuzma have 
focused on the importance of expertise and have observed that “[t]he 
existence of the revolving door could adversely impact the public’s 
confidence in new technological products, review protocols, regulatory 
 
32. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 690; deHaan et al., supra note 27, at 66. 
33. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 899. 
34. Id. 
35. See deHaan et al., supra note 27, at 91–92 (SEC); Gormley, supra note 7, 
at 681 (FCC). 
36. See Zahra Meghani & Jennifer Kuzma, The “Revolving Door” Between 
Regulatory Agencies and Industry: A Problem That Requires 
Reconceptualizing Objectivity, 24 J. Agric. & Envtl. Ethics 575, 581 
(2011); see also Jasanoff, supra note 18, at 95, 247 (noting that an 
excessive reliance upon the same group of experts revolving in and out of 
regulatory agencies, such as the EPA, can compromise those agencies’ 
independence and that, when this leads to a disproportionate voice for 
experts from the corporate sector, it “lead[s] to skepticism about the 
scientific claims certified by an [agency’s] advisory committee.”). 
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decisions about them, and the government in general.”37 They also 
conclude that “[t]he revolving door phenomenon virtually guarantees 
industry a seat at the policy-making table even though other 
stakeholders have no assurance that their concerns will be addressed by 
government regulatory bodies.”38 
Unconscious bias is also a concern. Sheila Jasanoff and Harvey 
Brooks have noted that the revolving door can transfer normative and 
political views from the private sector to government and influence 
government decision-making.39 They emphasize that people are not fully 
rational in making judgments about factual issues, and that scientific 
judgment can be swayed by normative and political views. Therefore, 
people who move from corporate to regulatory roles may unconsciously 
allow their sympathy toward corporations to influence their judgments, 
even if they intend to act faithfully in their regulatory capacity.40 In 
addition, as Brooks has noted: 
The more an issue is in the public eye, the more expert judgments 
are likely to be influenced unconsciously by pre-existing policy 
preferences or by supposedly unrelated factors such as media 
presentations, the opinions of colleagues or friends, or even the 
emotional overtones of certain words used in the debate.41 
 
37. Meghani & Kuzma, supra note 36, at 576. David Luban has described the 
insights gained from the revolving door “as a kind of ‘insider trading’ in 
the world of power, rather than finance,” and has argued that it “exhibits 
a disquieting agnosticism about the common good.” David Luban, The 
Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 717, 
728 (1988). 
38. Meghani & Kuzma, supra note 36, at 577. 
39. Jasanoff, supra note 18, at 69–71, 79–83, 234–41; Brooks, supra note 18, 
at 39–40; Alan S. Manne & Richard G. Richels, Probability Assessment 
and Decision Analysis of Alternative Nuclear Fuel Cycles, in National 
Energy Issues: How Do We Decide? 241, 264 (Robert G. Sachs, ed. 
1980). 
40. Jasanoff, supra note 18, at 69–71, 79–83, 234–41; Brooks, supra note 18, 
at 48 (“Energy experts, for example, tend to focus on energy production 
or on energy end use technical efficiency, with little consideration for 
environmental impacts or organizational and distributional effects. 
Experts on air pollution tend to ignore what effect air cleanup efforts 
might have on the pollution of other media, or at least to regard it as 
outside their purview. Experts on industrial policy see environmental, 
health, and safety regulations exclusively in terms of their retarding effects 
on economic growth; public health experts view industrial activities in 
terms of their potential impacts on public health, treating overall 
economic effects of emissions or ambient standards as outside their 
purview. Such fragmentation of expertise may also contribute to the 
current emphasis on single-issue politics.”). 
41. Brooks, supra note 18, at 40. 
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The revolving door also may induce government employees to 
increase the complexity of regulations to create demand for their 
expertise.42 Unlike the human-capital and rent-seeking theories, which 
both assume that government officials act in response to the needs of 
the private sector, the market-expansion theory assumes that 
individuals working in the public sector do not take corporate needs as 
a given. Instead, under this theory, government officials are incentivized 
to create regulatory systems that expand the private sector’s need for 
their services, thus increasing demand for their labor once they stop 
working for the government.43 This can manifest itself in different ways, 
depending on the government agency. For example, in a rule-making 
setting, government officials may advocate for the implementation of 
complex rules that require technical expertise to understand. Similarly, 
government officials in enforcement roles may support harsh penalties 
for failing to abide by enforcement policies to create demand in 
prospective employers for employees with enforcement expertise.44 
Overall, although the literature identifies a number of potential 
benefits from the traditional revolving door, the bulk of the literature 
suggests that the revolving door may induce government officials to act 
in ways that serve the private sector at the expense of the public 
interest. Not surprisingly, given the range of theories about the 
incentives created by the revolving door, a great deal of uncertainty 
exists in the empirical literature about the impact of the revolving door. 
A number of empirical studies have identified pro-private-sector bias 
arising from the revolving door, but the effects are difficult to tease out, 
and, as the Cox and Thomas study suggests, the effects may depend on 
the context in which employee decision-making occurs.45 
B. Regulatory Response 
Despite the ambiguity in the signal from empirical studies, concerns 
about agency capture and other adverse effects on government decision-
making have led to both legislative and regulatory efforts to restrict the 
revolving door. Congress has enacted several major statutes to address 
the adverse effects of the revolving door by promoting transparency, 
eliminating acts of reciprocity, and including other measures designed 
to maintain the integrity of government agencies.46 The first major 
 
42. See, e.g., Zheng, supra note 7, at 1269. 
43. Id.; Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 856–58. 
44. Zheng, supra note 7, at 1281. 
45. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 899. 
46. For an overview of post-Watergate legislation, see Johnson, supra note 8; 
Rafael Gely & Asghar Zardkoohi, Measuring the Effects of Post-
Government-Employment Restrictions, 3 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 288, 290–
92 (2001) (describing attempts to limit the revolving-door problem). For 
a discussion regarding revolving-door restrictions applicable to lawyers, 
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federal legislation on lobbying, the Federal Regulation Lobbying Act 
(FRLA) of 1946,47 established a general set of rules for lobbyists. The 
FRLA required lobbyists to disclose their personal expenditures and 
prohibited them from giving gifts to legislators. In the face of a First 
Amendment challenge, the Supreme Court upheld the FRLA, stating 
that, without the Act, “the voice of the people may all too easily be 
drowned out by the voice of special interest groups.”48 Although the 
FRLA did not directly address the revolving door, it sought to promote 
an ethical relationship between lobbyists and government officials, and 
it served as a precursor to later legislation. The Federal Regulation 
Lobbying Act was repealed in 1995 when it was replaced by the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act, which included similar provisions but created 
a more comprehensive registration process for lobbyists and required 
the disclosure of more specific information.49 
In 1962, Congress added two specific statutory provisions, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 207 and 208, that serve as the foundation for modern revolving-door 
laws.50 Section 207 sets forth strict regulations for government 
employees to follow once their government employment has 
terminated.51 Under this provision, members of the executive branch 
are permanently banned from “switching sides” on any matter that they 
“personally and substantially” participated in while working for the 
government.52 This bars former government employees from 
representing in court a private employer or lobbying group when the 
case involves an issue that they dealt with while in office. When the 
relevant matter is more broadly related to the individual’s previous 
government work, the statute only prohibits them from switching sides 
for two years. Additionally, former members of the executive branch 
are prohibited for one year following their service from facilitating trade 
or treaty negotiations. Depending on the seniority of the position they 
once held, former officials of both the legislative and executive branches 
 
see Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 L. & Soc. Inquiry 677, 689–90 
(1989). For an early focus on legislative lobbying, see Joseph I. Hochman, 
Comment, Post-Employment Lobbying Restrictions on the Legislative 
Branch of Government: A Minimalist Approach to Regulating Ethics in 
Government, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 883 (1990). 
47. Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 839 (repealed 1995).  
48. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954). 
49. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–12 (Supp. I 1995); see also Rebecca L. Anderson, The 
Rules in the Owners’ Box: Lobbying Regulations in State Legislatures, 40 
Urb. Law. 375, 382 (2008). 
50. 18 U.S.C. §§ 207–08 (Supp. I 1962). 
51. Id. § 207 (Supp. I 1962). 
52. See id. § 207(a); Jack Maskell, Cong. Research Serv., R42728, 
Post-Employment, “Revolving Door,” Laws for Federal 
Personnel 3 (2014). 
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are also subject to either one- or two-year “cooling-off” periods during 
which they may not make representational communications with other 
members of their respective branches. Finally, individuals who held 
certain high-level executive or legislative positions are prohibited from 
aiding foreign governments or political parties.53 Collectively, the 
provisions of § 207 established the modern foundation for post-
government service restrictions. 
Section 208 sets forth regulations that government employees must 
abide by while still employed by the government.54 Members of the 
executive branch cannot “personally and substantially” take part in any 
activity that will impact their financial interests, including any 
negotiations or arrangements regarding future private employment 
opportunities.55 Once a federal employee engages in negotiations for 
employment, the employee must remove themselves from any 
governmental responsibilities that have a direct effect on the financial 
interests of the involved private companies.56 In addition to their own 
personal financial interests, federal employees are prohibited from 
participating in activities that may affect the interests of their spouses, 
partners, or children. 
The next major piece of legislation, the Ethics in Government Act 
(EGA), was passed in 1978 and substantially expanded the existing 
requirements.57 The EGA was enacted in the years following the Nixon–
Watergate scandal, a time when mistrust of the government was high. 
Congress passed the EGA in an effort to bolster incentives for ethical 
practices among lobbyists and government employees and to restore the 
public’s faith in government.58 Building on the FRLA’s requirement 
that lobbyists disclose their contributions, the EGA required senior 
federal executives to publicly disclose their personal financial interests.59 
The requirement was designed to enhance transparency and reduce 
conflicts of interest between lobbyists and federal employees. Further, 
the EGA established several structural improvements in an effort to 
ensure greater compliance with existing ethics laws. For instance, the 
EGA mandated the creation of the Office of Government Ethics and 
the Office of Senate Legal Counsel, and it authorized the Attorney 
 
53. Maskell, supra note 52, at 3–6.  
54. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (Supp. I 1962). 
55. Id. 
56. See Maskell, supra note 53, at 8. 
57. 28 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. IV 1976).  
58. Cody D. Earl, Comment, Behind the Times: A Comparative Argument 
that the State of Idaho Should Combat the Revolving Door Effect with 
Waiting Period Legislation, 52 Idaho L. Rev. 639, 648 (2016). 
59. See J. Jackson Walter, The Ethics in Government Act, Conflict of Interest 
Laws and Presidential Recruiting, 41 Pub. Admin. Rev. 659, 659 (1981). 
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General to appoint a special counsel to investigate any member of the 
executive branch, including the President.60  
In response to the Jack Abramoff lobbying scandal, in 2006 
Congress adopted the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act 
(HLOGA). The Act provided more stringent regulations for lobbyists 
and federal employees, and it extended the “cooling-off” periods 
established in 18 U.S.C. § 207, mandating two years of cooling off for 
members of the legislative and executive branches before they can 
participate in lobbying activities.61 The Act also established criminal 
penalties for unethical private-employment negotiations and required 
the public disclosure of such violations. The HLOGA also banned 
lobbyists from offering gifts to federal employees in the form of paid 
trips, which formerly had been considered a loophole in the law. Finally, 
the Act included significant improvements to the oversight of lobbyists’ 
contributions to legislation.62 These improvements included more 
frequent disclosure reports, the creation of a public online database for 
these reports, and more accurate accounts of lobbyists’ personal and 
bundled contributions.63 
Although the efficacy of these provisions is beyond the scope of this 
Article, it is clear that concerns about the adverse effects of the 
revolving door between government and the private sector have driven 
much of the government-reform legislation of the last several decades. 
Little or no legislation or regulatory activity appears to promote the 
revolving door. Instead, the underlying concern appears to be derived 
from some form of the capture hypothesis: that movement between the 
private sector and government will induce government employees to 
serve private-sector interests, not the public interest, however defined. 
In Part III, we present the results of an empirical study that 
demonstrate a surprising amount of movement between environmental-
advocacy groups and the private sector, and we examine whether, just 
as the concerns about private sector-to-government movement may 
affect the government’s decision-making, the movement of 
environmental interests and values to corporations, institutional 
investment firms, and private equity firms may affect the decision-
making of these private sector organizations. 
II. The New Revolving Door 
The revolving-door literature has focused on the benefits and risks 
of employee movement between government and corporations. The 
 
60. See Anderson, supra note 49, at 380. 
61. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–14 (Supp. II 2007); Anderson, supra note 49, at 383; 
Maskell, supra note 53, at 1. 
62. Anderson, supra note 49, at 383–84.  
63. Id. at 384. 
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literature has emphasized the risks to the effectiveness and integrity of 
public governance, and the legislative and regulatory responses have 
reflected those concerns. In the last few decades, however, the federal-
legislative conveyor belt for major pollution-control statutes has ground 
to a halt, and the private sector has begun to play a greater role in 
performing traditionally governmental environmental-protection 
functions on issues ranging from climate change to toxics.64 If private 
environmental governance is playing a greater role in environmental 
protection, and if for-profit firms are motivated to respond to 
environmental problems by more than simply influencing government 
action, then we might expect to see greater demand by for-profit firms 
for environmental managers with environmental advocacy-group 
experience and perspectives, and greater movement between 
environmental-advocacy groups and those firms. 
Anecdotal media accounts have provided examples of individuals 
moving from environmental-advocacy groups to positions managing the 
sustainability efforts for companies or investment firms.65 For instance, 
Jackie Roberts moved from the Environmental Defense Fund to become 
the Chief Sustainability Officer for the Carlyle Group, where she 
manages the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) efforts of 
the firm.66 She spent seventeen years at the Environmental Defense 
fund before taking this position at Carlyle, having served as the 
Director of Sustainable Technologies and Senior Director of the 
Climate and Energy Idea Bank.67 Similarly, Elizabeth Seeger, the 
director of Sustainable Investing at KKR, followed a similar career 
trajectory. Seeger started her career at the Environmental Law 
Institute, a non-profit that conducts research on environmental law 
and policy. She then spent two years in the private sector, working 
 
64. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan A. Gilligan, Beyond 
Gridlock, 40 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 217 (2015) (climate change); Michael 
P. Vandenbergh et al., Lamarck Revisited: The Implications of 
Epigenetics for Environmental Law, 7 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 1, 
25–43 (2017) (toxics); Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as 
Environmental Law, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 137 (2019) (other topics). 
65. Although the new revolving door we discuss in the Article addresses 
movement between environmental advocacy groups and firms, there is 
some evidence of a related phenomenon involving conservative think 
tanks, tort-reform organizations, and the Reagan and Bush 
administrations. See W. John Moore, Keeping the Faith, 23 Nat’l J. 734, 
735–36 (1991). 
66. The Carlyle Group Names Jackie Roberts Chief Sustainability Officer, 
Carlyle Group (Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.carlyle.com/media-room/ 
 news-release-archive/carlyle-group-names-jackie-roberts-chief-sustainability-
officer [https://perma.cc/5ANZ-LPD7]. 
67. Operating Executives & Advisors: Jackie Roberts, Carlyle Group, 
https://www.carlyle.com/corporate-overview/operating-executives-advisors/ 
 jackie-roberts [https://perma.cc/QT5D-TW94] (last visited June 10, 2020).  
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at an information-technology consulting firm before taking a 
position at the Environmental Defense Fund.68 Following her 
tenure there, Seeger joined KRR. 
Given the growth of private environmental governance, it is 
plausible that these are not just outliers but examples of a more 
widespread phenomenon. To test this hypothesis, we conducted the 
first empirical study of the new revolving door between environmental-
advocacy groups and large corporations, institutional investment firms, 
and private equity firms. Below, we discuss the methodology, results, 
and implications of our study. 
A. Methodology 
Our study examined evidence of the movement of individuals who 
held management positions at environmental-advocacy groups and then 
transitioned to environmental-management positions in large 
corporations, institutional investment firms, and private equity firms. 
To begin, we defined environmental-advocacy group to mean a non-
governmental organization that is principally or substantially dedicated 
to environmental protection or sustainability advocacy (e.g., the 
Environmental Defense Fund, Sierra Club, and Natural Resources 
Defense Council). We defined corporate employment to mean corporate, 
institutional investment firm, or private equity firm employment in a 
position that is principally or substantially dedicated to managing 
environmental protection or sustainability issues. For environmental 
managers in firms, we searched websites to identify employees who held 
environmental-management positions based on the types of 
environmental employees who were publicly disclosed as playing some 
type of environmental management role by the firm. Within financial 
institutions, the individuals that fall into this category are often tasked 
with participating in the management of sustainable or responsible 
investing or investor relations. Within firms, these individuals may have 
broader tasks, such as compliance and reporting, and broader titles, 
such as chief sustainability officer or director of corporate social 
responsibility. 
We reviewed the publicly available data regarding environmental 
managers at the three types of firms in the United States discussed 
above: large corporations, large institutional investment firms, and 
large private equity firms.69 To perform this analysis, we selected the 
 
68. Team: Elizabeth Seeger, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, https://www.kkr 
 .com/our-firm/leadership/elizabeth-seeger [https://perma.cc/3657-PSXN] 
(last visited June 10, 2020).  
69. Although we examined these three categories, some firms fit into multiple 
categories. For example, Blackstone handles both private equity and 
institutional investing and its Chief Sustainability Officer handles all 
portfolios. See Blackstone, https://blackstone.com/the-firm/overview 
[https://perma.cc/23W2-P7K4] (last visited June 10, 2020). 
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100 largest firms on the Fortune 500 list of companies, the twenty-five 
largest firms on the Investment Pensions Europe (IPE) Top 400 list of 
asset managers, and the twenty-five largest firms on the Private Equity 
International (PEI) 300 list of private equity firms.70 Each of these 
publicly available sources ranked the firms based on revenue.71 To focus 
our study on the revolving-door phenomenon in the United States, we 
excluded firms not headquartered in the United States. 
Information about environmental or sustainability managers was 
not available for all of the firms on these three lists. Of the Fortune 100 
corporations, we were only able to locate information about the 
environmental or sustainability managers for eighty-one corporations.72 
Of the twenty-five largest institutional investment firms, we were able 
to locate information about environmental or sustainability managers 
for twenty firms. Of the twenty-five largest private equity firms, we 
were able to locate information about these managers for fourteen 
firms.73  
 
70. We reviewed the top-100 Fortune companies. In both the PEI and IPE 
lists, we reviewed the top twenty-five companies with headquarters 
located in the United States; we removed from our list any company 
headquartered outside of the United States. See Fortune 500, Fortune 
Mag., https://fortune.com/fortune500/2019/search/ [https://perma.cc/ 
 459U-GRRD] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020); PEI 300, Priv. Equity Int’l, 
https://www.privateequityinternational.com/database/#/pei-300 [https:// 
 perma.cc/MG9H-KFBZ] (last visited Jan 20, 2020); Inv. & Pensions 
Eur., The Top 400 Asset Managers 2019, at 1 (2019), https://www 
 .ipe.com/Uploads/j/e/b/Top-400-Ranking-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
 5BTC-2GXJ]. 
71. The Fortune 500 rankings are based on a company’s total revenue for the 
respective fiscal years. Methodology for Fortune 500, Fortune Mag., 
https://fortune.com/fortune500/2019/methodology [https://perma.cc/ 
 EFM7-N5MQ] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). The IPE 400 calculates the 
value of each manager’s global assets. Inv. & Pensions Eur., supra note 
70, at 1. The PEI 300 uses how much capital each company raised over 
the last five years. The World’s Largest Private Equity Firms, Priv. 
Equity Int’l, https://www.privateequityinternational.com/pei-300/ 
[https://perma.cc/AYF3-TBKV] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020). We started 
with the Fortune 500 companies but examined only the 100 largest of 
those firms, or the Fortune 100. A brief examination of the bottom 400 
firms identified fewer firms that provide public information on their 
environmental or sustainability managers. This may suggest that smaller 
firms simply have less of a presence online or that the new revolving door 
is a large-firm phenomenon. More research is needed to assess this issue. 
72. The lack of a website regarding sustainability or environmental initiatives 
may make it more likely that these firms do not have an environmental 
or sustainability staff, but we excluded them from our analysis and did 
not draw inferences from the lack of information. 
73. In the case of institutional investors, we found information about the 
sustainable-investing staff of twenty out of the twenty-five companies. 
The list of the top twenty-five large, institutional investors included two 
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For each firm for which we were able to locate information about 
environmental managers, we reviewed the previous work experience of 
the managers in charge of environmental matters. The firms differed in 
the location of information about the managers, the managers' titles, 
and the assignment of environmental responsibilities.74 We followed a 
set of uniform searching procedures to evaluate each firm. Across all 
three types of firms, we began by searching the corporate leadership 
page on the firm website for any managers in charge of environmental 
policy. The positions we looked for included chief sustainability officer, 
chief operating officer, or any vice president with relevant 
environmental or sustainable responsibilities. If the company’s website 
included biographies, we used the biographies to identify whether the 
manager had previously worked for an environmental-advocacy 
organization. If biographies were not available, we used LinkedIn or 
Bloomberg to ascertain the person's employment history. After 
examining the firm's corporate leadership page, we evaluated the 
environmental information available on the firm’s website. We 
examined the firm’s corporate responsibility webpage, or, if available, 
the firm’s page on environmental sustainability, for further information 
about the management of their sustainable policies.75 We then used 
LinkedIn to search for any additional environmental executives who 
were not listed on the corporate webpage. The search included the full 
company name and the following keywords: “chief sustainability 
officer,” “environment,” “sustainability,” and “corporate 
responsibility.”76 
We evaluated the data using two approaches. First, we used a broad 
definition, treating as a “revolver” any firm employee who held a 
position at some point in the past with an environmental-advocacy 
organization. We also examined the data using a narrow definition, 
treating as a revolver only those firm employees whose prior 
employment occurred with an environmental advocacy organization 
within the last eighteen months. We refer to this eighteen month period 
 
branches of Prudential Financial: PGIM and PGIM Fixed Income. Inv. 
& Pensions Eur., supra note 70, at 1. We treated these two branches as 
one unit because the impact-management team at Prudential oversees all 
of the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) efforts at Prudential. 
See Investing Sustainably, Prudential, https://www.prudential.com/ 
 links/about/green-investments [https://perma.cc/SQ43-ZUX2] (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2020). 
74. The companies on the list range in their services, functions, products, and 
environmental concerns. See Fortune 500, supra note 70. For example, a 
company such as Exxon Mobil, an oil and gas corporation, has different 
environmental responsibilities than JP Morgan Chase, a bank. 
75. For the private equity firms and asset managers, we searched for the 
company page on ESG investing. 
76. Again, for private equity firms and asset managers, we included the term 
“ESG investing.” 
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as a “cooling-off period.”77 In other words, we examined the data with 
no time limit, including as a revolver any firm employee who had 
worked at any point in the past for an environmental-advocacy 
organization (in a full-time, non-internship position), and we examined 
the data with an eighteen month time limit, excluding any employee 
whose employment as an environmental-advocacy-group manager 
concluded more than eighteen months before the employee moved to a 
firm. 
B. Results 
This study identified a substantial number of firms with employees 
who rotated through the new revolving door, moving from 
environmental-advocacy groups into positions managing the 
environmental policies of large companies, institutional investment 
firms, and private equity firms. Using the broad definition of revolver, 
of the firms for which information was available on the employment 
history of environmental managers, we found that roughly 6% of the 
large companies we studied, 15% of large institutional investment firms, 
and 29% of large private equity firms had at least one environmental 
manager who worked at some period in the past at an environmental-
advocacy group. Using the narrow definition of revolver, we found that 
roughly 4% of the large companies we studied, 5% of large institutional 
investment firms, and 29% of large private equity firms had at least one 
environmental manager who worked at an environmental advocacy 
group within the last eighteen months. The results for each type of firm 
are as follows: 
Corporations. Of the eighty-one large corporations for which we 
were able to locate information about environmental managers, we 
identified five firms with individuals who had rotated from an 
environmental advocacy group to the private sector. In other words, 
6% of the eighty-one corporations in our study employed an 
environmental manager who had previously worked at an 
environmental-advocacy group.78 We also examined the data using the 
 
77. Empirical studies of the revolving door have often used a “cooling-off” 
period in their research. See, e.g., Jacob R. Straus, Cong. Research Serv., 
R45946, Executive Branch Service and the “Revolving Door” in Cabinet 
Departments: Background and Issues for Congress (2019). A cooling-off 
period is an amount of time between an individual’s employment in the 
public and private sectors. Revolving Door Prohibitions, Nat’l Conf. 
St. Legis. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-
state-table-revolving-door-prohibitions.aspx [https://perma.cc./M9H8-
R2AB]. In some studies, if an individual surpasses the cooling-off period 
before moving through the revolving door, they are not considered to be 
a revolver. 
78. We identified six individuals out of eighty-one firms who had worked for 
an environmental advocacy group at some point. One company, 
Citigroup, had two of these revolvers, so the total of firms with a revolver 
was five. 
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more narrow definition of revolver, which excludes employees who 
moved from an environmental advocacy group to a firm more than 
eighteen-months after they worked for the advocacy group (the 
“cooling-off period”). We found that three firms or 4% had employees 
who met this narrow definition of revolver.  
Institutional Investment Firms. Of the twenty large institutional 
investment firms for which we were able to locate information about 
environmental managers, we found three firms with environmental 
managers who had worked for an environmental-advocacy group at 
some point in the past. Thus the results indicate that 15% of the large 
institutional investment firms for which we were able to locate 
information about environmental managers have an employee who 
worked at an environmental-advocacy group.79 Two of these employees 
moved to the institutional investment firms more than eighteen months 
after their employment with an environmental advocacy organization, 
so the application of the cooling off period reduces the total number of 
revolvers to one (or 5% of the twenty firms).  
Private Equity Firms. Of the fourteen large private equity firms for 
which we were able to locate information about environmental 
managers, we identified four individuals who had worked at an 
environmental-advocacy group at some point before moving into an 
environmental-management position at a private equity firm.80 As a 
result, 29% of the private equity firms in our study have an 
environmental manager who worked at an environmental-advocacy 
group. All of these employees moved to private equity firms within 
eighteen months of their employment with an environmental advocacy 
organization, so the application of the cooling off period has no effect 
on the results for the large private equity firms.  
Two other related phenomena emerged from the data. The first is 
that several individuals have moved from management positions in 
presidential administrations that are widely regarded as being pro-
environment to environmental management positions at private 
companies.81 This is a form of the traditional revolving door, but it 
raises an interesting new possibility: individuals who bring “green” 
values to companies from pro-environment administrations may be as 
likely to “green” firms when they move to the private sector as to 
 
79. In addition, one individual had previously worked at a non-environmental 
non-profit organization, but we did not include this individual in our total.  
80. Of the four revolvers, two individuals had previously worked at both 
environmental-advocacy groups and for the government before taking a 
position at a private equity firm. 
81. For an example of an empirical study that does not focus on the new 
revolving door specifically but attempts to identify a wide range of 
influences on firm behavior and environmental innovation, see Abdelfeteh 
Bitat, Environmental Regulation and Eco-innovation: The Porter Hypothesis 
Refined, 8 Eurasian Bus. Rev. 299 (2018). 
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produce pro-business outcomes while in government. An example is Lisa 
Jackson, the former EPA Administrator under President Obama. She 
has been a vocal advocate for climate mitigation since becoming the 
Vice President of Environment, Policy and Social Initiatives at 
Apple.  
We collected data from firm website biographies to identify whether 
a manager moved from a government environmental manager position 
at some point in the past. We found that among the corporations we 
studied twelve managers rotated from presidential administrations, and 
one individual worked for both an advocacy organization and an 
executive agency before taking a corporate job.82 We did not pursue 
this issue in greater detail, however, since the traditional revolving door 
literature already explores movement between government and the 
private sector, including administrations often considered to have a a 
pro- or anti-environmental perspective. 
The second phenomenon is the tendency for environmental or 
sustainability managers to have board memberships at environmental-
advocacy organizations. We found that eleven executives who manage 
environmental policies for Fortune 100 companies maintain affiliations 
with organizations such as land conservancies and solar-power 
initiatives. Further, there is a substantial amount of overlap between 
board memberships and the revolving door. Of those eleven individuals, 
five of them previously held management-level positions with either an 
environmental-advocacy group or the executive branch. Similarly, 
among the environmental and sustainability executives at institutional 
investors, we found eight individuals who have board memberships at 
environmental organizations; and among private equity firms, we 
identified four executives with similar board memberships. As to both 
institutional investors and private equity firms, we also observed 
examples of new-revolving-door activity. We did not pursue this issue 
in greater detail because there is a high likelihood that private-sector-
manager service on environmental-advocacy-group boards is not a new 
phenomenon. 
C. Implications 
The results discussed above suggest that the new revolving door for 
environmental managers is not an isolated phenomenon. Although the 
results do not indicate why this movement is occurring, or what effect 
it is having on firms, environmental groups, or environmental 
governance, the results raise several intriguing possibilities. As for why 
this movement is occurring, many large corporations and investment 
firms are increasingly motivated to reduce their environmental impacts 
 
82. We found that four of those individuals rotated from advocacy groups to 
the private sector and six of them rotated from presidential 
administrations. 
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and to improve their environmental reputation.83 For these firms, hiring 
an environmental-advocacy-group manager may provide expertise and 
credibility. These employees could provide reputational benefits to 
firms that are attempting to market to green retail and corporate 
customers and investors and that need to interact with green regulators 
and legislators. Jasanoff’s notion that some skills are best (or only) 
developed through previous engagement with a regulatory agency may 
also apply to the new revolving door. It may be that previous efforts 
by advocacy-group employees to shift private-sector behavior also apply 
to the value of movement of advocacy-group employees to corporations 
and investment firms. These employees may see profitable opportunities 
for efficiency or new markets, and they may understand the effects of 
the firm and how a firm is perceived in ways that are not apparent to 
the firm’s employees. They also may serve as internal watchdogs over 
the corporation’s behavior, which could be valuable for firms that rely 
heavily on their public reputation. 
In addition, the literature on the traditional private–public 
revolving door provides employee-based reason that the new revolving 
door may be occurring. Despite its focus on movement between 
government and corporations, the literature sheds some light on the 
motivations for, and the implications of, movement from 
environmental-advocacy groups to corporations. For instance, the 
public-service-motivation theory (PSM) seeks to explain the 
motivations of employees in ways that may shed light on why some 
move from environmental-advocacy groups to private firms.84 In their 
work on PSM, James Perry and Lois Wise identified three distinct 
categories of motivations that may influence an individual’s decision to 
work for the government–rational, norm-based, and affective.85 Rational 
motivations include a sense of self-importance from participating in 
policy formation, a personal identification with government programs, 
and a commitment to a special interest. Norm-based motivations 
include a sense of duty to serve the public interest, feelings of loyalty 
to the government, and a desire to protect social equity. Affective 
 
83. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan Gilligan, Beyond 
Politics: The Private Governance Response to Climate Change 
161 (2017). 
84. See Robert K. Christensen & Bradley E. Wright, The Effects of Public 
Service Motivation on Job Choice Decisions: Disentangling the Contributions 
of Person-Organization Fit and Person-Job Fit, 21 J. Pub. Admin. Res. 
& Theory 723, 723 (2011) (discussing public-sector employees’ 
motivations to join public service); James L. Perry & Lois Recascino Wise, 
The Motivational Bases of Public Service, 50 Pub. Admin. Rev. 367, 368 
(1990) (same). 
85. Perry & Wise, supra note 84, at 368.  
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motivations are a genuine belief in the social importance of a 
government program and the “patriotism of benevolence.”86 
Perry and Wise’s initial findings only explained why individuals 
may choose to move from the private sector to the public sector. Over 
the past thirty years, however, the concept has evolved to explain why 
individuals take positions that emphasize public service in any sector—
public, private, or non-profit.87 Researchers have concluded that PSM 
is related to a desire to do public service, not necessarily to work in the 
public sector. Therefore, PSM teaches that some individuals will work 
in any organization that will allow them to fulfill their desire for public 
service. If PSM is correct, and if firms are playing a greater role in 
environmental governance, we should expect to see employees at 
environmental-advocacy groups increasingly viewing private firms as 
employers who can provide opportunities for public service regarding 
environmental-protection. If the desire to do public service, not to have 
a government job, is at the root of some examples of the revolving door, 
private firms may appeal to this public-service mindset if they can 
persuade advocacy staff that they are committed to increasing their 
pro-environmental actions. Thus, PSM may shed light on persons 
moving not only between government and the private sector, but also 
between advocacy groups and private firms. 
As to the effect of the new revolving door on firms, the 
environmental managers who have moved to firms from environmental-
advocacy groups may have pro-environment attitudes that induce more 
pro-environment behavior from their new employers. In fact, the new 
revolving door may turn the central concern about the revolving door 
on its head: The movement of environmental advocates into corporate 
management positions may play the role of greening the private sector, 
inducing for-profit firms to act more in line with the public good. Legal 
obligations such as fiduciary duties may pose constraints, but the 
business-judgment rule provides a fair amount of decisional space 
to allow the new revolvers to pursue pro-environment outcomes in 
many situations.88 Hiring an environmental-advocacy-group manager 
may enable a firm to ensure that it will hear a diversity of views in an 
operating, investing, policymaking or regulatory process.89 To the 
 
86. Id. at 369. 
87. See Christensen & Wright, supra note 84, at 724 (noting that recent 
research suggests PSM applies to private-sector employees as well as 
public-sector employees); Anne Mette Kjeldsen & Christian Bøtcher 
Jacobsen, Public Service Motivation and Employment Sector: Attraction 
or Socialization?, 23 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 899, 900 (2013). 
88. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733, 777 (2004). 
89. See Jasanoff, supra note 18, at 94–95 (noting that the EPA’s scientific 
advisers have differing views that are unique to their long-term experience 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 4·2020 
The New Revolving Door 
1145 
extent that the ideology of C-suite executives and board members 
may be reducing their ability to understand and react to 
information about the greening of markets and the opportunities 
for corporate efficiency, the presence of these revolvers inside the 
tent may enable firms to be more profitable. The presence of the 
new revolvers also may make it more difficult for private firms to 
violate environmental regulations because there may be a greater 
chance that a revolver will speak up before a violation occurs, and 
because other employees will perceive there to be a greater risk 
that someone inside the firm will speak up or become a 
whistleblower. 
To the extent that environmental-advocacy group employees have 
knowledge, values, and credibility regarding various types of 
environmental initiatives, these employees may also be more likely to 
participate in private environmental initiatives such those that 
advocate for greater disclosure of carbon emissions, setting emissions 
goals, adopting environmentally friendly supply-chain-contracting 
requirements, and participating in various collaborative processes. The 
new revolving door thus could accelerate development of collaborative 
NGO–corporate initiatives. Virginia Haufler has argued that there is a 
positive role for engagement between NGOs and firms—an argument 
that may extend to more favorable judgments about environmental-
advocacy-group–corporate revolving doors if they lead to greater firm 
transparency:  
We are still in the early stages of developing “ground rules” for 
interaction between the private sector and its critics, however. 
But one way to ensure the legitimacy of private sector standard 
setting is to make sure the process of developing and 
 
working for the Agency); Roger A. Pielke, The Honest Broker: 
Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics 151 (2007) (arguing 
that a decision-maker seeking an “Honest Broker of Policy Alternatives” 
should assemble a group of “people with diverse perspectives to provide a 
range of options”). Some writers have focused on the importance of 
transparency about the NGO process for assuring both public trust and 
rigorous evaluation of issues before the NGO. See, e.g., Robert O. 
Keohane & Joseph S. Jr. Nye, Power and Interdependence in the 
Information Age, 77 Foreign Aff., Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 92 (“To be 
credible, the information must be produced through a process that is in 
accordance with professional norms and characterized by transparency 
and procedural fairness.”); see also Graeme Auld, Constructing 
Private Governance: The Rise and Evolution of Forest, 
Coffee, and Fisheries Certification 39 (2014) (quoting Keohane & 
Nye in the context of addressing conflicts of interest between non-profits 
and their corporate partners in private-environmental governance). 
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implementing standards is a shared endeavor among business, 
NGOs, and representative institutions . . . .90 
The movement of environmental managers from advocacy organizations 
to firms thus has the potential for a positive, “greening” effect on 
corporate decisions, although additional empirical work remains to be 
done to test this assertion. 
As we noted above, Cox and Thomas suggest that the risks of 
pro-corporate bias arising from the traditional revolving door 
among lower-level SEC employees may be limited by the fact that 
many SEC decisions are made with input from groups of employees 
and with many layers of oversight.91 They conclude that the 
greatest risk of bias arises at the director level where those 
constraints are less influential.92 If the same phenomenon occurs 
within corporations, institutional investment firms, and private 
equity firms, then we should expect to see some greening influence 
arise in firms when advocacy group staff move into middle and 
senior level management positions where they are less constrained 
than lower-level employees. The advocacy group-private sector 
movement that we have observed has occurred into higher-level 
positions such as the chief sustainability officer, so we might expect 
to see important greening occur in these firms, but this is another 
area where additional empirical work remains to be done.  
As the discussion above suggests, the new revolvers may 
somewhat reduce concerns about agency capture by inducing 
businesses to take a less adversarial posture toward government in 
lobbying, rule-making proceedings, and litigation. In addition, the 
new revolving door employees may be a new source of expertise 
that poses less risk of capture than movement between government 
and the private sector. The advocacy group-firm revolvers may be 
well-balanced hybrids who possess a form of human capital—
knowledge of, and experience with, both advocacy-groups’ and 
 
90. Virginia Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector: 
Industry Self-Regulation in a Global Economy 119 (2001). But 
Haufler also cautions that such engagement presents new issues:  
Private sector standard setting also poses new challenges for 
NGOs. To the degree that voluntary initiatives actually raise 
standards, the business sector will expect less criticism from these 
groups. NGOs will need to publicize good behavior, instead of 
concentrating their attention on the bad. But the level of trust 
between many NGOs and the business community is quite low. 
Some organizations may be willing to engage in dialogue and form 
partnerships for specific projects, but they may not be able to 
sustain a long-term relationship.” Id. at 5. 
91. Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 886. 
92. Id. at 888–89.  
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businesses’ goals, methods, and information—that is difficult to 
find elsewhere. 
The new revolving door also poses a number of risks. For those who 
believe that a firm should pursue profit over other objectives in all 
cases, the presence within the firm of former environmental-advocacy-
group managers could threaten the firm’s ability to pursue that 
mandate. The movement of managers from environmental groups to 
private firms also could have a “de-greening” effect on advocacy groups 
by draining away talent. The movement from advocacy groups into 
firms also could subtly alter the motivations of some advocacy-group 
employees.93 
D. Limitations 
We only examined a subset of the largest U.S. corporations, 
institutional investment firms, and private equity firms In this study. 
We also only examined publicly available data about those firms from 
their websites and LinkedIn. The large firms excluded from our study 
may not include similar movement from environmental-advocacy 
groups to firms, and the new green revolving door may not be occurring 
at smaller firms or at firms outside the United States. In addition, our 
data only reflect the current status of employees at the firms we studied, 
and it is possible that the new revolving door has occurred unobserved 
for many years and thus is not a new form of the revolving door. A 
longitudinal study would be required to examine this issue. 
We examined movement from environmental-advocacy groups to 
for-profit firms, but we did not study movement from firms to 
environmental-advocacy groups; so another limitation of this research 
is that it studied movement in one direction rather than a two-way 
revolving door. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that a 
substantial amount of movement has occurred from firms to 
environmental-advocacy groups. For instance, Jason Clay, who 
manages a division of the World Wildlife Fund, has recruited several 
former business managers because of their expertise in supply-chain 
management and commodities.94 Important tasks for future research 
will be to examine movement from firms to advocacy groups and to 
explore the implications of that movement. 
Finally, we focused on environmental managers, but we did not 
evaluate whether the new revolving door is emerging for other 
managers. If the new revolving door is the result of an increase in 
private governance initiatives, we would expect the new revolving door 
 
93. See Auld, supra note 89, at 42–43; Benjamin Cashore et al., 
Governing Through Markets: Forest Certification and the 
Emergence of Non-State Authority 36–37 (2004). 
94. Jason Clay: Senior Vice President, Markets, World Wildlife Fund, 
https://www.worldwildlife.org/leaders/jason-clay [https://perma.cc/L35X-
46QQ] (last visited Jan. 23, 2020). 
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to be occurring in other topic areas where private governance is 
competing with or complementing public governance. Examples include 
labor regulation, health and safety, fair trade, and food safety.95 
Conclusion 
The persistent gridlock over federal pollution-control legislation 
during the last quarter century has left a gap between the public’s 
preferences for environmental protection and the actions of the federal 
government. This gap has been filled in part by private environmental 
governance, and the growth of this form of environmental governance 
has generated new interest in the motivations of private firms, the 
effects of private initiatives on human health and the environment, and 
the interactions between public and private governance. Research on 
these questions will be important for understanding not only the role of 
the private sector but also the future of federal environmental 
regulation and the EPA. In this Article, we explored a fascinating new 
development that signals the growing importance of private sector 
responses to environmental problems: the emergence of a new revolving 
door. Since the birth of the modern environmental statutory framework 
in the 1970s, environmental law scholars have focused on the role of 
public governance and have raised concerns that the revolving door 
between corporations and government agencies could induce 
government officials to pursue corporate interests at the expense of 
environmental protection. In addition, the broader legal and political-
science literatures have identified benefits that may arise from the 
revolving door, but the thrust of the scholarship to date has emphasized 
the potential harms. 
In this Article, we demonstrated that a new revolving door has 
emerged alongside the private sector’s increased role in environmental 
governance. Rather than employees moving between government and 
corporations, this new revolving door involves employees moving 
between environmental-advocacy groups and large corporations, 
institutional investment firms, and private equity firms. Using several 
data sources, we demonstrated that this new revolving door is 
surprisingly common, and we examined the implications for the future 
of public and private environmental governance. Although this new 
revolving door is not without risk, we argue that it may turn the central 
concern about the revolving door on its head: The movement of 
environmental advocates into firm management positions may green 
the private sector and accelerate the development of private 
environmental initiatives. We focused on the movement of 
environmental or sustainability managers between advocacy groups and 
corporations, but we suggest that the new revolving door also may be 
 
95. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 4 (identifying examples of private 
governance in these areas on a global level). 
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emerging regarding labor, health and safety, fair trade, food safety, and 
other areas. 
